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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Chelsi Lyn Urias appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon her conditional
guilty plea to methamphetamine possession. On appeal, Urias challenges the district court’s
denial of her motion to suppress.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In June 2019, parole officer Michael Alboucq of the Idaho Department of Correction
made a supervisory residence check at the Ririe, Idaho home of Bryce Amos, a parolee. (2/11/20
Tr., p.8, L.10 – p.10, L.25. 1) Pursuant to his parole agreement 2, Amos was required to submit to
searches of his person or property, including his residence; and had waived his constitutional
rights with respect to such searches. (Exhibits, p.11.)
Officer Alboucq had never met Amos before, but reviewed the IDOC’s notes of parole
officer interactions with him prior to the residence check. (2/11/20 Tr., p.11, L.23 – p.12, L.25.)
These notes indicated that Amos had continuously resided at the Ririe residence since at least
January 2019. (Exhibits, pp.5-9.) Based upon information received from another officer who
spoke with Amos, Officer Alboucq also knew that Amos was “living in a house with a female,”
and understood this to mean that Amos was in a dating relationship with a woman he was living
with. (2/11/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-19; p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.14.) Officer Alboucq also received

1

Citations to page numbers of each of the transcripts cited in this brief refer to the page numbers
on the bottom of each page – which are one number different from the page numbers on the top
right of the pages.
2

The relevant portion of the parole agreement provided: “Parolee will submit to a search of
person or property, to include residence and vehicle, at any time and place by any agent of Field
and Community Services and s/he does waive constitutional right to be free from such
searching.” (Exhibits, p.11.)
1

information from an individual that Amos had stolen two firearms from him. (2/11/20 Tr., p.13,
L.20 – p.14, L.19.)
Officer Alboucq, accompanied by ISP officers, knocked on the door of the residence, but
received no response, despite observing movement inside the house. (2/11/20 Tr., p.14, L.9 –
p.15, L.17.) Some children who were playing in the backyard confirmed that Amos was in the
residence and accompanied Officer Alboucq and the ISP officers inside. (2/11/20 Tr., p.15, L.18
– p.16, L.8.) There, the officers made contact with Amos, who “pretty much welcomed [them]”
in. (2/11/20 Tr., p.16, Ls.8-9.)
Officer Alboucq spoke with Amos in the living room, and ascertained that Chelsi Urias
and Urias’ father also lived at the residence. (2/11/20 Tr., p.18, L.7 – p.19, L.21.) Officer
Alboucq learned that Urias’ father resided in a back bedroom, and that Urias was taking a
shower at the time of the officers’ arrival. (2/11/20 Tr., p.19, L.5 – p.20, L.11.) Amos told
Officer Alboucq that he slept on the living room couch. (2/11/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-14.) However,
Officer Alboucq was skeptical of this assertion because he did not see any blankets or pillows
around the couch, and because a backpack in the vicinity was determined to belong to someone
else. (2/11/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-18; p.36, Ls.4-16.)
Officer Alboucq then conducted a protective sweep of the house. (2/11/20 Tr., p.20,
Ls.19-25.) He knocked on Urias’ father’s bedroom door, and hearing no response, 3 walked
through the house to a stairwell that led to the basement. (2/11/20 Tr., p.21, Ls.1-9.) He walked
down the stairs and saw a laundry/storage room, and a room without a door that appeared to be a
bedroom. (2/11/20 Tr., p.21, L.15 – p.22, L.23.) From the bottom of the stairs, Officer Alboucq
could look into the bedroom and observe a methamphetamine bong lying on the floor. (2/11/20
3

The officers ultimately did not enter or search Urias’ father’s room. (2/11/20 Tr., p.35, Ls.1122.)
2

Tr., p.21, L.15 – p.22, L.1; p.22, L.16 – p.24, L.14.) Officer Alboucq walked through the
bedroom and observed another methamphetamine bong on an end table. (2/11/20 Tr., p.24, L.15
– p.25, L.16.)

Officer Alboucq did not retrieve either of these bongs at this time, but instead

returned to the living room to speak with Amos. (2/11/20 Tr., p.25, L.17 – p.26, L.10.)
There, Amos told Officer Alboucq that he went to the downstairs bedroom “just every
once in a while,” and that he had used drugs in that room before. (2/11/20 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-15;
p.28, Ls.6-9.) Amos also confirmed that he was “living with a girl” at the residence, whom
Officer Alboucq presumed to be Urias, who resided in the downstairs bedroom. (2/11/20 Tr.,
p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.14; p.36, Ls.4-9.) Based upon the information he received, Officer Alboucq
contacted his supervisor and requested, and was granted, permission to search the house.
(2/11/20 Tr., p.25, L.22 – p.26, L.4; p.37, L.13 – p.38, L.4.)
Officer Alboucq then searched the downstairs bedroom with one of the ISP troopers.
(2/11/20 Tr., p.28, Ls.19-23; p.29, Ls.5-12.) This search revealed several more pipes, a syringe
loaded with suspected methamphetamine, and a small baggy containing methamphetamine
residue. (2/11/20 Tr., p.29, Ls.13-21.) The officers did not speak with Urias before searching
the room. (2/11/20 Tr., p.28, L.24 – p.29, L.4.) After the search, officers arrested both Amos
(who admitted, after the search, that he would fail a drug test), and Urias. (2/11/20 Tr., p.29,
L.22 - p.30, L.8.) The state charged Urias with possession of methamphetamine. (R., pp.24-26.)
Urias filed a motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained from her residence. (R.,
pp.31-33, 38-43.) She argued that her bedroom was beyond the scope of the consent provided by
Amos’ parole agreement in light of the fact that Amos told the officers that he slept on the couch
in the living room.

(R., pp.38-43.)

Officer Alboucq testified at the suppression hearing

consistent with the above description of the residence check and search. (2/11/20 Tr., p.8, L.1 –

3

p.39, L.24.) Urias testified that Amos only stayed at her residence occasionally, and that at the
time of the officers’ residence check, Amos was only spending the night there after his car broke
down. (2/11/20 Tr., p.42, L.19 – p.43, L.18.) Urias also denied that she ever had a sexual
relationship with Amos – contrary to Officer Alboucq’s suppression hearing testimony that
Amos discussed the sexual nature of this relationship in a jail phone call made several months
after the residence check.

(2/11/20 Tr., p.27, L.12 – p.28, L.3; p.44, Ls.14-24.)

Urias

acknowledged that she knew Amos was on parole. (2/11/20 Tr., p.46, Ls.4-6.)
The district court denied the motion to suppress. (R., pp.57-66.) Applying State v.
Barker, 136 Idaho 728, 730, 40 P.3d 86, 88 (2002), the district court concluded that based upon
the information he obtained, Officer Alboucq had reasonable suspicion that Amos’ access and
control in the residence was not limited to the living room, but extended to the bedroom where
the contraband was found. (R., pp.62-65.) Therefore, the court concluded, the search was lawful
pursuant to consent and Fourth Amendment waiver contained in Amos’ parole agreement. (Id.)
Urias entered a conditional guilty plea to methamphetamine possession, preserving her
right to appeal the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress. 4 (R., pp.70-73; 3/9/20 Tr.,
p.6, L.13 – p.14, L.18.) The district court imposed a unified four-year sentence with two years
fixed but suspended the sentence and placed Urias on probation for three years. (R., pp.85-91;
6/22/20 Tr., p.24, L.4 – p.25, L.6.) Urias timely appealed. (R., pp.92-94.)
4

The written plea agreement submitted to the district court did not provide that the plea was
conditional. (See R., pp.70-73.) To the contrary, the portion of the agreement entitled
“Defendant’s Acknowledgement and Consent,” which was signed by Urias, provided that her
“agreement to waive her rights to appeal,” was one of the “expressed conditions precedent upon
which this plea agreement [was] hereby entered into.” (R., p.72.) However, at the change of
plea hearing, Urias’ defense counsel and the prosecutor informed the court of their stipulation to
permit Urias to submit a conditional plea preserving her right to appeal the court’s denial of her
motion to suppress. (3/9/20 Tr., p.6, Ls.13 – p.7, L.12; p.14, Ls.3-18.) The court “orally”
amended the written plea agreement and accepted Urias’ conditional guilty plea. (3/9/20 Tr.,
p.7, Ls.13-16.)
4

ISSUE
Urias states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Urias’s motion to suppress?
(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Urias failed to show that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress
evidence obtained from Officer Alboueq’s search of her residence?

5

ARGUMENT
Urias Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Denying Her Motion To Suppress
Evidence Obtained From Officer Alboueq’s Search Of Her Residence
A.

Introduction
Urias contends that the district court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence

obtained from Officer Alboueq’s search of her residence.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.8-15.)

Specifically, Urias contends that the officers’ authority to search Amos’ residence pursuant to the
terms of Amos’ parole agreement did not extend to her downstairs bedroom. (Id.)

Urias’

contention fails because a review of suppression hearing testimony and exhibits reveals that
Officer Alboucq had reasonable suspicion that Amos was involved in a dating relationship with
Urias and possessed common authority over the downstairs bedroom. Therefore, the search was
lawful pursuant to applicable precedent, and Urias has failed to demonstrate that the district court
erred.
B.

Standard Of Review
In reviewing an order granting or denying a motion to suppress evidence, the appellate

court applies a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d
182, 183 (2009) (citing State v. Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005)). The
appellate court defers to the trial court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous;
however, the appellate court freely reviews the determination as to whether constitutional
requirements have been satisfied in light of the facts found. State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 345,
256 P.3d 750, 753 (2011) (citing State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 485, 163 P.3d 1194, 1197
(2007)).

6

C.

The District Court Correctly Determined That The Terms Of Amos’ Parole Agreement
Justified The Officers’ Search Of The Downstairs Bedroom
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable

searches. 5 Warrantless searches are unconstitutional, unless they are authorized by a recognized
exception to the warrant requirement. Barker, 136 Idaho at 730, 40 P.3d at 88 (citing State v.
Johnson, 110 Idaho 516, 716 P.2d 1288 (1986)). Consenting to a search is a well-recognized
exception to the warrant requirement, and Idaho law has made it clear that a probationer or
parolee can consent to a search of all their property as a condition of that supervision.
Hansen, 151 Idaho at 345, 256 P.3d at 753. Consent to search as a condition of probation or
parole constitutes a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. Id.
“When the state seeks to justify a warrantless search based upon consent, it is not limited
to proof that the consent was given by the defendant.” Barker, 136 Idaho at 730, 40 P.3d at 88.
The state may show that consent came from a third party who “possessed common authority over
or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. at 730-731,
40 P.3d at 88-89 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)).

“The common

authority of the third party does not rest upon the law of property.” Id. The state is not required
to show that the third party actually had a property interest in the effects searched. Id. “Rather,
the common authority rests upon the joint access or control of the property searched,” id., “so
that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the
inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number
might permit the common area to be searched,” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7.

5

Urias did not argue, to the district court or on appeal, that the Idaho Constitution provides more
protection than the Fourth Amendment with respect to the relevant issues in this case.
7

When a defendant meets her burden to show that there was a warrantless search protected
by the Fourth Amendment and that she has standing to challenge it, the state has the burden to
prove the legality of the search under one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, such as
consent. State v. Holland, 135 Idaho 159, 162, 15 P.3d 1167, 1170 (2000). The standard for
measuring the scope of a consent to search is that of objective reasonableness. Florida v.
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990)
(describing the relevant question as, “would the facts available to the officer at the
moment…warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises?”) (internal quotation omitted).
In Barker, the Idaho Supreme Court analyzed the lawful scope of a warrantless search
justified by a parolee’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Barker, 136 Idaho at 730-732,
40 P.3d at 88-90. Tate, Barker’s boyfriend, violated his parole by failing to report to his parole
officer. Id. at 729, 40 P.3d at 87. The parole officer went to Barker’s apartment after learning
that Tate had been seen there. Id. at 729-730, 40 P.3d at 87-88. The officer located Tate outside
of the apartment and arrested him. Id. at 730, 40 P.3d at 88. Tate told the officer that he had
been living at Barker’s apartment for the previous few weeks. Id.
Officers then contacted Barker at the apartment. Id. Despite Barker’s denials that Tate
had been living there, the officers searched the apartment pursuant to Tate’s Fourth Amendment
waiver. Id. The officers also located a fanny pack on a counter in the master bedroom. Id. A
drug dog alerted on the fanny pack. Id. After Barker then admitted ownership of the fanny pack,
officers searched it and located methamphetamine and a vehicle title with both Tate’s and
Barker’s names on it. Id. The state charged Barker with possession of methamphetamine. Id.

8

The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of Barker’s motion to
suppress evidence recovered from the fanny pack. Id. at 730-732, 40 P.3d at 88-90. The Court
first held that Tate’s parole agreement constituted valid consent to search Tate’s and Barker’s
residence, including the master bedroom which was occupied by both Tate and Barker. Id. at
731, 40 P.3d at 89. This was because Tate had “common authority over the bedroom sufficient
for him to consent to a search of that room.” Id.
The Court then held that the scope of this search extended to the fanny pack. Id. at 731732, 40 P.3d at 89-90. The Court concluded that the officers could lawfully search any item in
the shared bedroom if they possessed reasonable suspicion that Tate owned, possessed, or
controlled the item. Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 932 F.2d 752 (9th Cir. 1991).) The Court
further recognized that the “circumstances need not indicate that the item was obviously and
undeniably owned, possessed, or controlled by Tate,” and that the officers were not required to
inquire into the ownership, possession, or control of the fanny pack. Id. at 732, 40 P.3d at 90.
Finally, after reviewing the totality of the circumstances of the case, the Idaho Supreme Court
concluded that the officer had reasonable suspicion that Tate had at least joint possession or
control of the fanny pack, and that the search was therefore lawful under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
More recently, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected an appellant’s contention that the
reasonable suspicion standard utilized in Barker was contrary to United States Supreme Court
precedent, and held that a probation officer’s search of a backpack was lawful because the officer
had reasonable suspicion that the backpack was owned, possessed, or controlled, by an
absconded felony probationer who was an overnight guest at the residence. State v. Garnett, 165
Idaho 845, 847-850, 453 P.3d 838, 840-843 (2019).

9

“‘Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts. Reasonable suspicion requires more than a mere
hunch or inchoate and unparticularized suspicion.”’ State v. Fairchild, 164 Idaho 336, 429 P.3d
877 (Ct. App. 2019) (quoting State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124 (2013)).
“The reasonableness of the suspicion must be evaluated upon the totality of the circumstances.”
Id. (citing State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483, 988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 1999)).
Reasonable suspicion “requires less than probable cause but more than mere speculation or
instinct on the part of the officer.” Id. (citing Ferreira, 133 Idaho at 483, 988 P.2d at 709). “‘A
determination that reasonable suspicion exists, however, need not rule out the possibility of
innocent conduct.”’ Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002)).
Since “the entrance of the probationer’s home requires only a reasonable suspicion that
authority to enter exists,” and “it is not a stretch to infer that the scope of a search of a
probationer’s belongings is constrained by the same standard,” Garnett, 165 Idaho at 850, 453
P.3d at 843, it is likewise logical that a search of a particular room in the probationer’s or
parolee’s residence also requires only reasonable suspicion that the probationer or parolee has
joint access or control of the room. In this case, Urias did not contend below or on appeal that
the search of any particular items in the bedroom was beyond the scope of Amos’ parole
agreement – only that the bedroom itself was beyond that scope. (See Appellant’s brief, pp.8-15;
R., pp.40-42.) A review of the record reveals that the district court, applying the reasonable

10

suspicion standard mandated in Barker and Garnett, correctly concluded that Officer Alboucq
had reasonable suspicion that Amos had joint access or control with respect to Urias’ bedroom. 6
Initially, the IDOC supervision notes reviewed by Officer Alboucq before the search
established that Amos reported that he had lived at the Ririe home for an extended period of
time. Prior to the June 2019 residency check, Amos had specifically reported living at the
residence earlier that June, January 2019, February 2019, and March 2019. (Exhibits, pp.5-9.)
Officer Alboucq also testified that he believed Amos to be in a dating relationship with Urias
during this time. (2/11/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-19; p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.14.) This information was
based upon Officer Alboucq being “told that [Amos] was living in a house with a female,
essentially,” being told by Amos at the house that Amos was “living with a girl,” and the
contexts of these conversations that led Officer Alboucq to interpret the statements to mean that
Amos was living with a woman he had a dating relationship with. (2/11/20 Tr., p.13, Ls.15-19;
p.26, L.16 – p.27, L.14.)
Upon his arrival to the residence, Amos asserted that he slept on the living room couch.
(2/11/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.10-14.) However, Officer Alboucq was reasonably skeptical of this
assertion in light of: (1) the information he received that Amos was in a dating relationship with
a woman who also resided at the house; (2) Amos’ reports that he had continuously lived at the
residence for the previous six months; and (3) there were no blankets or pillows around the
couch indicating a longer-term residency there, and a backpack in the vicinity was determined to
belong to someone else.

(2/11/20 Tr., p.20, Ls.15-18; p.36, Ls.4-16.)

6

In light of these

On appeal, Urias also argues that Officer Alboucq’s observation of the methamphetamine
bongs did not itself justify the warrantless search of the rest of the bedroom under the plain view
exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant’s brief, pp.15-17.) The state agrees, and
submits that while the district court referenced the plain view exception in its memorandum
decision, it did not apply or base its decision upon it. (See R., pp.62-65.)
11

circumstances, it was reasonable for Officer Alboucq to assume that Amos actually resided in
Urias’ bedroom downstairs, apparently the only bedroom in the house occupied by a woman, and
the only other bedroom in the house aside from the one occupied by Urias’ father.
The reasonableness of Officer Alboucq’s decision-making in this case is further bolstered
by the cautiousness he displayed before making the search.

Officer Alboucq did not

immediately search the downstairs bedroom, but did so only upon receiving approval to do so
from his supervisor. (2/11/20 Tr., p.25, L.22 – p.26, L.4; p.37, L.13 – p.38, L.4.) Further,
Officer Alboucq did not search the entire house, but only the portion in which he reasonably
believed Amos had common access.

While Officer Alboucq knocked on Urias’ father’s

bedroom, he did not open the door or search that room. (2/11/20 Tr., p.35, Ls.11-22.)
Officer Alboucq possessed reasonable suspicion that Amos possessed common authority
over, or other sufficient relationship to, the downstairs bedroom. The search of the bedroom was
therefore within the scope of the consent provided by Amos’ parole agreement and of the Fourth
Amendment waiver.

Urias has failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in so

concluding, and in denying her motion to suppress.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of conviction and the
district court’s denial of Urias’ motion to suppress.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2021.

/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of June, 2021, served a true and correct
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DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
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/s/ Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

13

